Last modified: 2014-05-12 10:44:51 UTC

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Bug 63961 - Replace "upload by url" whitelist by blacklist
Replace "upload by url" whitelist by blacklist
Status: NEW
Product: MediaWiki
Classification: Unclassified
Uploading (Other open bugs)
1.23.0
All All
: Lowest enhancement (vote)
: ---
Assigned To: Nobody - You can work on this!
:
Depends on:
Blocks:
  Show dependency treegraph
 
Reported: 2014-04-15 19:44 UTC by Marco
Modified: 2014-05-12 10:44 UTC (History)
14 users (show)

See Also:
Web browser: ---
Mobile Platform: ---
Assignee Huggle Beta Tester: ---


Attachments

Description Marco 2014-04-15 19:44:24 UTC
There is no reason to maintain a "upload by url" whitelist instead of a blacklist considering that there should not be any technical difficulties (except bug 42473 ).

Furthermore only trusted community members (e.g. administrators) are granted the "upload_by_url" right so this is not a problem as well.
Comment 1 Bryan Davis 2014-04-16 16:20:23 UTC
Apparently opened in response to my request for justification on https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/#/c/126384/ (Adding '*.panoramio.com' to the wgCopyUploadsDomains array).
Comment 2 Sam Reed (reedy) 2014-04-16 16:25:01 UTC
(In reply to Marco from comment #0)
> There is no reason to maintain a "upload by url" whitelist instead of a
> blacklist considering that there should not be any technical difficulties
> (except bug 42473 ).

Why?

If we're going to whitelist all, there's probably little point attempting to blacklist anything
Comment 3 Marco 2014-04-17 07:36:28 UTC
(In reply to Sam Reed (reedy) from comment #2)
> Why?

* Do you mean that some domains could serve corrupt files which can compromise the wmf network when uploading by url?
* Did we encounter any problems after adding the ~20 urls we currently have in the commonswiki-array?
* Is there any other way to find out if there are problems than whitelisting all domains in a test environment?

> If we're going to whitelist all, there's probably little point attempting to
> blacklist anything

Thats true, would be "nice" to have, though.
Comment 4 Bawolff (Brian Wolff) 2014-04-17 07:56:58 UTC
(In reply to Marco from comment #3)
> (In reply to Sam Reed (reedy) from comment #2)
> > Why?
> 
> * Do you mean that some domains could serve corrupt files which can
> compromise the wmf network when uploading by url?

I believe the concern is potential to be used as part of a DOS attack. Invalid files/viruses/etc are not really a concern as that is not unique to url uploading.

> * Did we encounter any problems after adding the ~20 urls we currently have
> in the commonswiki-array?

Not as far as I know. I highly doubt it.

> * Is there any other way to find out if there are problems than whitelisting
> all domains in a test environment?

Any issues would probably be for security reasons (or perhaps patanoia) i believe. Thats not something a test site would help with. Its the sort of thing that needs to be analytically evaluated (by Chris?)

Of course i could just be missing some big issue.


> > If we're going to whitelist all, there's probably little point attempting to
> > blacklist anything
> 
> Thats true, would be "nice" to have, though.

I dont see why. Does anyone actually have any sites to blacklist?.

----

The why for this is presumably commons folks want to be able to use gwtoolset with new sites without asking for a config change first (and having to wait several days). I could certainly see why - instant gratification is more fun :)
Comment 5 Chris Steipp 2014-04-17 17:58:51 UTC
I prefer a whitelist for two reasons:

* When we have security issues that effect the outbound connection (the curl-imap overflow, and need I even bring up heartbleed), then forcing a delay between when someone setting up a hostile server to exploit the flow and getting requests from wmf servers is a good thing.

* If an attacker is running a 0-day attack, and gets the url approved before we patch our servers, we at least have an audit log of who requested and approved the url whenever we figure out it's hostile.
Comment 6 Rainer Rillke @commons.wikimedia 2014-05-12 10:44:51 UTC
(In reply to Chris Steipp from comment #5)
> then forcing a delay is a good thing
That's true. And what I notice is that none of the "big" sites allow users upload-by-url.
On the other hand you'll have to spam the config more and more and there's always someone required to merge the patch. These people are usually short in time.

> we at least have an audit log of who requested and approved the url whenever we 
> figure out it's hostile
I suppose you cannot blame the approver as a site may look completely harmless when looking at it and as for the requester/patchset uploader, you do not require personal identification so you do not have more information compared to which user issued the action=upload&url=... command at Commons.

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